Russia as a Fascist State: An Analytical Deconstruction of the Regime

The question of whether modern Russia is a fascist state has moved beyond emotional debate and into the realm of rigorous political science analysis. While researchers in the early 2010s spoke of “hybrid authoritarianism,” by 2026 the institutional and ideological transformations allow many experts to classify the regime as “rashism” — a specific form of 21st-century fascism.

In this article, we do not apply labels. We take established academic criteria of fascism and systematically test each one against the evidence from modern Russia. The reader can independently assess the degree of correspondence.

Methodological caveat. The theoretical models used in this analysis (Eco, Griffin, Paxton, Snyder) were developed primarily on the basis of 20th-century European fascism. Their application to a 21st-century post-Soviet state is permissible but has limitations: Russia is not an exact copy of 1920s Italy or 1930s Germany — it is a different society, a different economy, a different era. Where Russian realities correspond to the criteria not fully but in a modified form, this is noted. The section on alternative classifications examines the positions of scholars who dispute the applicability of the term “fascism” to Russia.

1. Umberto Eco: 14 Features of “Eternal Fascism”

In his essay “Ur-Fascism” (1995), Italian philosopher Umberto Eco, who grew up under Mussolini’s regime, identified 14 features of what he called “eternal fascism.” Eco emphasized that these features do not form a system — a single one is sufficient for a fascist ideology to begin crystallizing around it. Below is each of the 14 features and its manifestation in modern Russia.

1. The Cult of Tradition

A syncretic belief in “ancient truths,” incompatible with critical examination.

In Russia: The rhetoric of ‘spiritual bonds’ (dukhovnye skrepy), the elevation of the 1945 victory to sacred status, the juxtaposition of “ancestral values” against the “decaying West.” The law on “protection of religious feelings” (Art. 148 of the Criminal Code, 2013). The adoption of constitutional amendments in 2020 mentioning “faith in God” and “historical truth.” The state church (the Russian Orthodox Church) acts as an ideological partner of the government, blessing military aggression.

2. Rejection of Modernism

The Enlightenment and rationalism are perceived as moral decay.

In Russia: Systematic discrediting of “Western values” as alien and destructive. Rhetoric about “Gayropa” in state media. The ban on “propaganda of non-traditional relationships” (2022, expanded from minors to all citizens). The abandonment of the Bologna education system in 2022 as a “return to national roots.”

3. The Cult of Action for Action’s Sake

Action is valued above reflection; intellectualism is perceived as weakness.

In Russia: Anti-intellectual rhetoric directed at the “liberal intelligentsia.” Mass emigration of scholars and specialists after 2022 (estimated at 500,000 to 1 million people). Television propagandists have displaced experts from public discourse. Critical thinking has become synonymous with disloyalty.

4. Disagreement Is Treason

Any dissent is suppressed as a threat to national unity.

In Russia: Art. 207.3 of the Criminal Code — “spreading knowingly false information about the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (up to 15 years). Art. 280.3 of the Criminal Code — “discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” The “foreign agents” law, expanded in 2022: designation no longer requires proof of foreign funding — “being under foreign influence” is sufficient.

What does “foreign influence” mean under this law? Virtually anything. The wording is so vague that, according to Human Rights Watch’s assessment, “almost any person or organization, regardless of citizenship or location, engaged in civic activism or even expressing an opinion on Russian politics, can be designated a foreign agent.” Unlike the American FARA, which requires proof that a person is acting on behalf of a foreign government, the Russian law presumes foreign control from the mere fact of any, even minimal, contact with abroad.

Who has been affected in practice:

Dmitry Muratov, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta — designated a foreign agent for “disseminating negative opinions about Russia’s foreign and domestic policy.”
Evgeny Kissin, pianist, Grammy laureate — designated a foreign agent for speaking out against the war.
Priest Grigory Mikhnov-Vaitenko — designated a foreign agent for helping Ukrainian refugees and giving interviews to “foreign agent” media.
Stand-up comedian Denis Alyoshin — designated a foreign agent for his anti-war stance.
Chechen opposition blogger Tumso Abdurakhmanov — designated a foreign agent while in political asylum in Sweden.

A Nobel laureate, a pianist, a priest, a comedian, an emigrant — all of them either criticized Kremlin policy or spoke out against the war, effectively opposing official propaganda. The ECHR ruled this law a violation of human rights as early as June 2022. Russia ignored the ruling.

By 2024, the oldest and most authoritative institutions of Russian civil society had been placed on the “foreign agents” and “undesirable organizations” registries:

Memorial (founded in 1989 by Andrei Sakharov) — designated a foreign agent in 2016, liquidated by court order in December 2021. An organization that had spent 30 years documenting repressions — from the Stalinist Gulag to the Chechen wars.
Andrei Sakharov Foundation (founded in 1989) — designated an “undesirable organization” in January 2023. The legacy of a Nobel laureate became a “threat to state security.”
Moscow Helsinki Group (founded in 1976, the oldest human rights organization in Russia) — placed under threat of liquidation.
Levada Center (the only independent polling organization) — designated a foreign agent in September 2016, two weeks before parliamentary elections. Conducting sociological surveys became a form of “foreign influence.”

Dissent is punished not only administratively but also physically:

Alexei Navalny — Russia’s most prominent opposition politician. In August 2020, poisoned with the military nerve agent Novichok (developed by Russian intelligence services). He survived and was treated in Germany. In January 2021, he returned to Russia and was immediately arrested. Sentenced to 19 years in prison on cumulative charges. Spent nearly 300 days in solitary confinement. Died on February 16, 2024 at the “Polar Wolf” penal colony above the Arctic Circle. The official cause was “sudden death syndrome.” Western leaders held Putin responsible.
Evan Gershkovich — Wall Street Journal correspondent, American citizen. Arrested on March 29, 2023 in Yekaterinburg on charges of espionage for the CIA. The charges were rejected by the journalist, the editorial board, and the U.S. government. Sentenced to 16 years in a closed trial. Released in August 2024 as part of the largest prisoner exchange since the Cold War (26 people, 6 countries). His case is a direct demonstration that in Russia, journalism is equated with espionage.

5. Fear of Difference

Exploitation of xenophobia and racism; “others” as a threat.

In Russia: Recognition of the “international LGBT movement” as an extremist organization (Supreme Court ruling, November 2023). Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses (designated as extremists in 2017, hundreds of criminal cases).

Systematic suppression of small peoples and national minorities:

Crimean Tatars: following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Mejlis — the representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, which had existed since 1991 — was designated an extremist organization and banned in 2016. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to lift the ban — Russia refused. More than 100 Crimean Muslims (predominantly Tatars) are being prosecuted on fabricated terrorism charges with sentences of up to 24 years.
Minority languages: in 2018, a law was passed making the teaching of 34 national languages (Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, and others) voluntary instead of mandatory. Putin personally initiated this policy, declaring that the Russian language is the “spiritual framework” of the country. Meanwhile, Russia accuses Latvia of “linguistic genocide” for an analogous policy toward Russian speakers.
Ethnic minorities as cannon fodder: Buryats, Tuvans, Dagestanis, and other peoples of the Russian periphery suffer disproportionate casualties in the war in Ukraine. Military recruitment offices systematically target the poorest regions where minorities live, while Moscow and St. Petersburg are virtually untouched by mobilization. Former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj called this the transformation of Mongol ethnic groups into “cannon fodder.”

The image of an external enemy is constructed at the highest state level. This is not the rhetoric of marginal bloggers — these are the direct words of the president:

Putin, address to participants of the World Russian People’s Council, November 2023: “We are defending the security and well-being of our people… from the West’s attempts to dismember and plunder Russia”.
Putin, ibid.: “We are now fighting for the freedom not only of Russia but of the entire world.”
Putin, Valdai Forum, October 2022: the world has entered “the most dangerous decade since World War II,” and the West is playing a “dangerous, bloody and dirty game.”
Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly, 2023: “After long centuries of colonialism, diktat, and hegemony, they have grown accustomed to getting away with everything, accustomed to spitting on the entire world.”

The construct “the West wants to destroy Russia” has no evidentiary basis. Not a single Western state has declared an intention to “dismember” Russia. Before 2022, NATO’s military presence on the eastern flank totaled ~4,500 personnel — compared to the 900,000-strong Russian army (detailed analysis in Section 7, Myth 3). The myth of an external threat is a classic instrument of fascist mobilization: when the nation is “in danger,” any dissent becomes treason.

6. Appeal to a Frustrated Middle Class

Mobilization of economically or socially disadvantaged groups.

In Russia: The narrative of the “wild ’90s” as a time of national disgrace when “the West plundered Russia.” The promise of “stability” in exchange for loyalty. Military contracts with payments many times the average salary in the regions — as a recruitment tool in impoverished areas. “Rising from the knees” as compensation for collective trauma.

7. Obsession with a Plot

Conspiratorial thinking as the foundation of ideology.

In Russia: The thesis of a “ring of enemies” and NATO’s plans for the “destruction of Russia.” The narrative of “Ukrainian biolabs” funded by the Pentagon. Conspiracy accusations against the Soros Foundation, “world government,” and “the Anglo-Saxons.” Conspiracy theories are broadcast at the state level — not by marginal bloggers, but by the top officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Security Council.

8. The Enemy Is Both Too Strong and Too Weak

The adversary is portrayed as an omnipotent threat and a pathetic failure simultaneously.

In Russia: Ukraine in Russian propaganda is simultaneously “a NATO puppet with billions of dollars in Western weapons” and “a Nazi pseudo-state that will collapse in three days.” The West “is rotting and on the verge of collapse” yet simultaneously “is waging a mortal war of annihilation against Russia.” The U.S. is “a paper tiger,” yet every American move requires an emergency meeting of the Russian Security Council.

9. Life as Permanent Warfare

Pacifism = treason; the nation is in an eternal state of siege.

In Russia: The rhetoric “the West is waging war against us” predates 2022 by years. The “special military operation” escalated into open mobilization (September 2022). Anti-war sentiment has been criminalized. The defense budget for 2025 reached a record 13.5 trillion rubles — over 40% of total federal spending. War has been normalized as “defense of the Fatherland” for an indefinite period.

10. Contempt for the Weak

Pity and compassion are signs of weakness; strength is the only virtue.

In Russia: Glorification of Prigozhin’s Wagner Group mercenaries, who practiced sledgehammer executions. Dehumanization of prisoners and civilians in Z-channels. The cult of the “real man” in state media. Public humiliation of “traitors” (dousing with brilliant green dye, “pillars of shame”). Veterans’ benefits as a display of concern for “the strong,” while completely ignoring the victims of war.

11. The Cult of Heroic Death

Every citizen must be prepared to become a hero and die for the Motherland.

In Russia: The Yunarmia (Youth Army) movement — 1.75 million schoolchildren, with a target of 3.25 million by 2030. Budget doubled in 2025 to 1 billion rubles. “Conversations About Important Things” (Razgovory o vazhnom) — mandatory weekly patriotic education lessons in schools. Glorification of death on the front in state media. Mothers of fallen soldiers thanking Putin for “the honor” — a persistent television format.

12. Machismo

Aggressive masculinity as a virtue; women and “non-traditional” people as threats.

In Russia: A total ban on “LGBT propaganda” (2022). Partial decriminalization of domestic violence (2017, the so-called “slapping law” — first-time assault was reclassified from a criminal to an administrative offense). The cult of Putin’s “masculinity” in state media (riding a horse, bare-chested, on a submarine). The public rhetoric of Kadyrov, Prigozhin, and Simonyan is overtly brutal, featuring threats of physical violence.

13. Selective Populism

The leader claims to express the will of the people while suppressing individual rights.

In Russia: “Putin is Russia, Russia is Putin” (Vyacheslav Volodin, Speaker of the State Duma, 2014). The result of the 2024 “elections” — 87.28% with a turnout of 77.49%, while genuine competition was excluded. Public institutions (the Civic Chamber, the All-Russia People’s Front) simulate popular representation with no actual autonomy. Any uncontrolled forms of popular will (protests, independent trade unions) are suppressed.

14. Newspeak

Impoverishment of language to limit critical thinking.

In Russia: “Special military operation” instead of “war” — using the word “war” risks criminal prosecution. “Denazification” and “demilitarization” — instead of “occupation.” “Negative growth” instead of “recession.” “Unfriendly countries” instead of “the entire democratic world.” “Liberation” instead of “destruction.” Control over language is enshrined in law: Art. 207.3 of the Criminal Code punishes not actions but words.

2. Roger Griffin: Palingenetic Ultranationalism

British political scientist Roger Griffin, in his work The Nature of Fascism (1991), proposed a minimal definition of fascism: palingenetic ultranationalism — the myth of a nation’s rebirth from the ashes of decline.

Three mandatory elements:

Palingenesis (from Greek “new birth”) — the idea that the nation has endured a period of catastrophic decline and requires revolutionary rebirth.
Populism — the leader acts as the embodiment of the will of the “true people.”
Ultranationalism — the nation is defined as an organic whole that stands above the individual.

How This Works in Russia

The palingenetic myth is the central narrative of Putin’s Russia. It is built on a three-act structure:

Lost greatness: The Soviet empire as a golden age, whose dissolution Putin called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” (Address to the Federal Assembly, 2005).
Period of decline: The 1990s as a “time of shame,” when Russia “was on its knees” before the West, having lost territories and influence.
Rebirth: “Rising from the knees” under Putin’s leadership — the return of Crimea (2014), the “restoration of historical justice,” military aggression as an instrument for reclaiming lost status.

Griffin emphasized that fascism differs from ordinary authoritarianism precisely in its revolutionary element — the promise of the nation’s complete rebirth. The Putin regime does not merely hold onto power; it offers a messianic project — the return of Russia to “historical greatness” through war and confrontation.

3. Robert Paxton: The Five Stages of Fascism

American historian Robert Paxton, in The Anatomy of Fascism (2004), defines fascism not through ideology but through actions. He identifies five stages through which a fascist regime progresses:

Stage	Description	Russia
1. Creation of a movement	Formation of an ideological core around a myth of decline and rebirth	✓ Early 2000s: consolidation around the idea of a “strong Russia.” Creation of United Russia, youth movements Nashi, Young Guard
2. Rooting in the political system	The movement embeds itself within existing institutions	✓ 2003–2012: monopolization of parliament, subordination of the judiciary, the “vertical of power”
3. Seizure of power	Establishment of control over the state	✓ By 2012–2014: complete control over all branches of government, annexation of Crimea as the turning point
4. Exercise of power	Radicalization of domestic and foreign policy	✓ 2014–2022: “foreign agents” laws, “undesirable organizations” laws, suppression of protests, poisoning of Navalny
5. Radicalization	War, genocidal rhetoric, total societal mobilization	✓ 2022–present: full-scale invasion of Ukraine, mobilization, destruction of the remnants of civil society

Under Paxton’s classification, Russia is at the fifth and final stage — the stage of radicalization, characterized by external aggression, total mobilization, and the suppression of all internal dissent.

4. Timothy Snyder: The Politics of Eternity and Schizofascism

Historian Timothy Snyder of Yale University, one of the leading scholars of Eastern Europe, analyzes the Russian regime in two key works: On Tyranny (2017) and The Road to Unfreedom (2018).

The Politics of Eternity

Snyder introduces two opposing modes of temporal perception:

The politics of inevitability — the belief that progress is unstoppable and liberal democracy will triumph on its own. This is the illusion that the West believed in after 1991.
The politics of eternity — a cyclical worldview in which the nation is an eternal victim of eternal enemies. Progress is impossible, reforms are pointless, and the only salvation is a strong leader.

Putin’s Russia is a classic example of the politics of eternity. The regime does not promise improvement; it promises protection from endless threats. The news cycle is built not on successes but on fears: NATO at the borders, “Nazis in Kyiv,” “biolabs,” “the Satanic West.” Citizens do not expect a better future — they are grateful that things have not gotten worse.

Schizofascism

Snyder introduces the term “schizofascism”: a situation in which a regime that practices fascism accuses its victims of fascism. This is not mere hypocrisy — it is a structural element of the ideology:

Russia invades Ukraine under the slogan of “denazification,” while itself exhibiting all the hallmarks of fascism.
Anti-fascist rhetoric (the cult of the 1945 Victory) is used to justify fascist practices: the cult of the leader, genocidal rhetoric, mass violence.
The word “Nazi” has lost its specific meaning and has come to mean “anyone who resists Russia.”

The Role of Oligarchy

Snyder points out that Russian fascism has a pronounced oligarchic character. Unlike classical fascist regimes, which appealed to “the little man,” the Putin regime openly serves the interests of the super-wealthy class, concealing this behind nationalist demagoguery. The philosopher Ivan Ilyin, whose works Putin has repeatedly cited publicly, advocated precisely such a model — “authoritarian democracy” under the guidance of a spiritual leader.

5. The Specificity of Russian Fascism: Fascism Without the Masses?

Classical fascist regimes — Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany — came to power on the crest of a powerful grassroots movement. Millions of people voluntarily took to the streets, joined parties, and demanded radical change. Fascism from below — the ecstatic crowds — was the fuel without which the seizure of power was impossible.

In Russia, everything is arranged differently. There are no ecstatic crowds. There is no mass movement demanding war and repression. The Putin regime did not seize power — it already had it and gradually transformed it into fascism. This required not enthusiasm but silence.

Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), described a mechanism that explains the Russian specificity more precisely than any modern analyst. Arendt showed that totalitarian regimes rely not on convinced supporters but on atomized masses — people stripped of horizontal connections, not participating in politics, not united by shared interests. Such people are “too numerous or too indifferent to be integrated into any organization based on common interest.” It is precisely from this reservoir of indifference that totalitarianism draws its strength.

Russia in the 2020s is effectively a canonical example of what Arendt describes. Twenty years of deliberate destruction of civil society, independent media, trade unions, local self-governance, and political parties have led to a society that is atomized. These actions are typical of totalitarian regimes seeking to concentrate all power and maximize its security. People are united by nothing except what is offered to them from above through propaganda and religion (which is also state-controlled). The majority of society does not enthusiastically support the war, but it also does not resist it. Apathy has become a viable substitute for enthusiasm. Depoliticization has replaced societal mobilization. The result, however, is the same: the regime operates without constraints.

Where classical fascism mobilized the masses through ideology, the Russian regime additionally employs a direct economic mechanism. Military contracts with signing bonuses of several million rubles — sums unattainable through years of legal employment in the poorest regions — turn the war into an economic proposition for those who have no alternatives. Fanaticism is not required: poverty, desperation, and a signature on a contract are sufficient. This is a specific hybrid — a fascist war machine running not on ideological fuel but on commercial contracts with the most vulnerable segments of the population.

This does not weaken the diagnosis of “fascism” — it refines it. Russian fascism is 21st-century fascism, adapted to a post-Soviet society. It does not need torchlight processions or overt majority support. It is enough that society remains silent and the poorest strata are economically drawn into the war machine — and this combination of silence and material dependence constitutes a form of complicity. Not legal, but historical.

6. Institutional Facts of Fascistization

Theoretical analysis must be supported by specific institutional changes. By 2026, Russia demonstrates systemic transformations that go beyond a simple dictatorship.

Liquidation of Civil Society

Memorial — the oldest human rights organization in Russia, founded by Andrei Sakharov, was liquidated by order of the Supreme Court on December 28, 2021. The formal pretext was violation of “foreign agent” labeling requirements. The actual reason, as stated by the prosecution in court: Memorial created “a false image of the USSR as a terrorist state.”
The “foreign agents” law, expanded in 2022, permits designation without proof of receiving foreign funding. By 2024, hundreds of organizations and individuals had been placed on the registry.
The ECHR ruled the “foreign agents” law a violation of human rights (June 2022).

Destruction of Independent Media

In the first days after the invasion of Ukraine (March 2022), all major independent media outlets were shut down or forced to cease operations:

Echo of Moscow (Ekho Moskvy) — liquidated on March 3, 2022 after 31 years of broadcasting.
Dozhd (TV Rain) — suspended operations on March 3, 2022.
Novaya Gazeta — ceased publications about the war on March 4, 2022; its license was revoked later. Editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov — Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 2021.
Blocked: Meduza, Mediazona, Current Time, DOXA, The Village, and dozens of others.

Simulation of Justice

The acquittal rate in Russian courts is 0.26% (2024). For comparison: in the United Kingdom it is approximately 20%, in the United States approximately 17%.
Jury trials result in acquittals in ~24% of cases, but more than 60% of those are overturned on appeal.
For political cases, the acquittal rate approaches zero.

Militarization of Childhood

Yunarmia (Youth Army): 1.75 million members, with a target of 3.25 million by 2030.
The organization’s budget was doubled in 2025 to 1 billion rubles.
“Conversations About Important Things” (Razgovory o vazhnom) — mandatory weekly patriotic education lessons in schools since September 2022.
Yunarmia has been placed on Western sanctions lists on charges of involvement in the forcible deportation of Ukrainian children.

Corporativism

The fusion of the state, intelligence services, and business into a single structure:

The largest companies (Gazprom, Rosneft, Russian Railways) are managed by people from Putin’s inner circle.
Private property is subordinated to the interests of the regime: nationalization of assets belonging to the “disloyal” (Khodorkovsky, 2003; assets of foreign companies after 2022).
Wagner Group — a private military company that operated as an instrument of state policy in Syria, Africa, and Ukraine.

The key distinction between Russian corporativism and Western corporate lobbying: in Russia, business has no agency. Oligarchs are not independent political actors but custodians of assets who hold property conditionally, as long as they demonstrate loyalty. This was established by the Khodorkovsky precedent in 2003: the attempt by the country’s richest man to act as an independent political figure ended in arrest, confiscation of YUKOS, and 10 years in prison. Since then, no major businessman has spoken out against the regime. Yevgeny Prigozhin — a man who had his own army — died in a plane crash on August 23, 2023, exactly two months after his attempted mutiny. After 2022, foreign companies cannot leave the Russian market without permission from a government commission, and assets of departing firms are confiscated in favor of the state. Property in Russia is not a right but a privilege, revocable at the decision of a single person.

Control of the Information Space

Russia received 17 out of 100 points on the Freedom on the Net 2025 index (Freedom House) — a status of “not free.”
Testing of the “sovereign internet” — infrastructure for disconnecting the country from the global network.
Blocking of VPN services, fines for using tools to circumvent blocks.

The Architecture of Propaganda: Beyond Television

The common perception of Russian propaganda centers on television. This is an outdated model. By 2024, the regime has built a multi-layered ecosystem of opinion leaders, segmented by target audiences and simulating ideological pluralism.

First level — state television. According to the Levada Center, television remains the news source for ~65% of Russians. This is the base channel that sets the general line: “the special operation is going according to plan,” “the West is the enemy,” “Russia is surrounded by threats.”

Second level — Z-Telegram and military bloggers (milbloggers). After the start of the invasion, official Defense Ministry briefings quickly lost credibility among people directly connected to the military operations. So-called milbloggers — war correspondents and commentators operating on Telegram — were allowed to fill this vacuum. They offer their audience a narrative closer to reality than television: they acknowledge failures, criticize generals, and demand “fighting harder.” However, the war itself is never questioned. Criticism is directed not at the regime but at its “insufficient resolve.” The Kremlin strategically allows this “loyal criticism,” using bloggers simultaneously as a pressure-release valve and a barometer of public sentiment.

Third level — segmented publics and channels. Beyond military topics, there is an extensive network of Telegram channels and social media communities targeting various audiences: “tough guy” publics with aggressive masculine aesthetics, channels for veterans and security forces, Orthodox-patriotic communities, conservative “family values” groups. Each segment receives the same baseline agenda (support for the war, hostility toward the West, rejection of dissent) but in adapted packaging and in the language of its audience.

Fourth level — pseudo-opposition. The most sophisticated element of the system. A number of public figures and channels position themselves as “opposition” or an “alternative perspective,” while reproducing the regime’s key narratives. They may criticize individual officials or petty corruption, but they never challenge the system’s fundamental foundations — and at critical moments they transmit the required position. This creates an illusion for the audience: “even the opposition thinks this way.”

The cumulative effect of this architecture is not simply the delivery of propaganda messages but the construction of an illusion of total support across all layers of society. When a person sees the same position from a television host, an “honest” military blogger, a “tough guy” public, and an “opposition” channel, they develop the feeling that “everyone thinks this way.” This is not a coincidence but the result of a managed ecosystem in which the permissible range of opinions is constrained: one may debate tactics but never the war itself, never the regime, and never the leader.

Psychological Impact: The Spiral of Silence and Identity Usurpation

Multi-layered propaganda exerts pressure on the individual that goes far beyond informational influence. German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann described this mechanism as the “spiral of silence” (1974): people constantly assess which opinions dominate in their environment, and if they perceive their own position as a minority one, they suppress it out of fear of social isolation. The more dissenters remain silent, the more confidently the majority speaks; the more confidently the majority speaks, the deeper the dissenters fall silent. The cycle is self-reinforcing.

Within the Russian propaganda ecosystem, the spiral of silence operates with particular effectiveness. A person who does not support the war encounters a uniform position at every level: on television, on Telegram, in “opposition” channels, among colleagues, among relatives, at parent-teacher meetings. The actual distribution of opinions is irrelevant — only the perceived majority matters. The person begins to feel like the only one who “isn’t like everyone else.” This feeling is not a side effect of propaganda — it is its goal.

But the pressure is not limited to social isolation. The state has systematically usurped the right to patriotism, culture, and national identity. “The Motherland,” “Russian culture,” “historical memory,” “victory” — all of this has been appropriated by the regime and embedded in its ideological construct. Disagreement with Kremlin policy is automatically interpreted as a renunciation of one’s own roots, a betrayal of “one’s own people.” A person who speaks out against the war is presented with a false choice: either you are with the regime — or you are abandoning your country, your language, your culture, and your belonging.

This makes dissent in Russia psychologically devastating on a scale that is difficult to imagine from the outside. This is not about civic disagreement — as, for example, protest against the Vietnam War, where protesters remained Americans appealing to American values. In Russia, a protester automatically “ceases to be Russian” — at least within the framework imposed by propaganda. They are denied not only the right to an opinion but the right to an identity. This is precisely why many dissenters, upon leaving Russia, experience not relief but a crisis: they are deprived not only of a country but of the language in which they can speak about it without being classified as “traitors.”

7. Debunking Propaganda Myths: “Isn’t It the Same in the West?”

A typical technique of Russian propaganda is whataboutism: an attempt to equate repression in the Russian Federation with regulation in democratic countries. Let us examine the main arguments.

Myth 1: “In the EU and U.S. They Also Persecute People for Free Speech”

Reality:

Criterion	Democratic Countries	Russia
Procedure	Decisions are made by independent courts. The Digital Services Act (EU, 2024) regulates platform algorithms and content moderation	Extrajudicial blocking by Roskomnadzor. Criminal prosecution for expressing opinions
Target of sanctions	Fines are imposed on corporations (Meta, X, Google) for non-compliance with moderation rules	Criminal prosecution of private individuals for social media posts, solo pickets, clothing color
Appeal	A developed system of appeals. Courts in the U.S. have blocked executive orders restricting free speech	Acquittal rate — 0.26%. Appeals are meaningless
Direction	Restrictions are debated, criticized, and overturned	Restrictions only tighten: from administrative fines to criminal sentences

Myth 2: “Western Values Are Just Another Imposed Ideology”

Reality: Liberal democracy is by definition pluralistic — it allows conservative, socialist, and libertarian views to coexist within a single system. Fascism is totalitarian: it demands not merely loyalty but active complicity.

In Russia, the absence of Z-symbolism in the workplace can become grounds for dismissal. Teachers receive guidelines on the content of “Conversations About Important Things.” Actors and musicians who spoke out against the war have lost contracts and been forced to emigrate.

In democratic countries, the absence of support for any agenda (LGBT, environmental, conservative) does not lead to criminal prosecution.

Myth 3: “Russia Is Simply Defending Itself Against NATO”

Reality: The thesis of a “NATO attack” does not withstand scrutiny against actual military presence, documents, and chronology.

Military presence. Before February 2022, across NATO’s entire eastern flank (the Baltics + Poland), four multinational battalion battle groups totaling ~4,500 personnel were deployed. For comparison: the Russian Armed Forces at that time numbered approximately 900,000 personnel, and the invasion force assembled for the attack on Ukraine was approximately 190,000. Four and a half thousand soldiers versus 900,000 — this is not an offensive force. It is a symbolic presence.

Documents. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997), the alliance explicitly stated that it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and would not station “substantial combat forces” on a permanent basis. Russia signed this document. Until 2022, NATO fulfilled these obligations.

Military exercises. The largest NATO exercise before the invasion — Steadfast Defender 2021 — involved 9,000 troops. For comparison: Russia’s Zapad-2017 and Zapad-2021 exercises were repeatedly used as cover for real military operations — in particular, they preceded the invasion of Georgia (2008) and the buildup of forces on Ukraine’s borders.

Chronology. NATO expansion occurred not through conquest but through applications from the countries themselves — and in every case, the motivation was experience of Russian pressure or aggression. Finland and Sweden, which had maintained neutrality for decades, applied for NATO membership immediately following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia attacked Ukraine — a country that was not and could not in the foreseeable future become a NATO member.

Russia is the only country to have carried out military annexation of another state’s territory in Europe since 1945 (Crimea 2014, attempted occupation of Ukraine 2022), and to have used military force to detach territories from neighboring states (Georgia 2008). The “defense against NATO” narrative is supported by neither troop numbers, nor documents, nor the chronology of events.

Summary Table: Russia and the Criteria of Fascism

Theorist	Key Criterion	Present in Russia?	Comment
Eco (1)	Cult of tradition	✓ Fully	’Spiritual bonds’ (dukhovnye skrepy), 2020 constitutional amendments, Russian Orthodox Church
Eco (2)	Rejection of modernism	✓ In modified form	Selective: “Western values” are rejected, technology is not
Eco (3)	Cult of action	✓ Fully	Anti-intellectualism, emigration of scholars, propagandists instead of experts
Eco (4)	Disagreement = treason	✓ Fully	Foreign agents law, Art. 207.3, Art. 280.3 of the Criminal Code
Eco (5)	Fear of difference	✓ Fully	LGBT, Crimean Tatars, suppression of minority languages
Eco (6)	Frustrated middle class	✓ In modified form	Not mobilization of the middle class but exploitation of poverty in the lower strata
Eco (7)	Obsession with a plot	✓ Fully	”Biolabs,” “ring of enemies,” conspiracy theories at the Foreign Ministry level
Eco (8)	Enemy is both strong and weak	✓ Fully	Ukraine — “NATO puppet” and “pseudo-state” simultaneously
Eco (9)	Permanent warfare	✓ Fully	40%+ of budget on defense, criminalization of pacifism
Eco (10)	Contempt for the weak	✓ Fully	Glorification of Wagner Group, dehumanization of “traitors”
Eco (11)	Cult of heroic death	✓ Fully	Yunarmia, “Conversations About Important Things,” mothers thanking for “the honor”
Eco (12)	Machismo	✓ Fully	Ban on “LGBT propaganda,” decriminalization of domestic violence
Eco (13)	Selective populism	✓ Fully	87.28% in “elections,” simulation of popular representation
Eco (14)	Newspeak	✓ Fully	”SMO” (special military operation), “denazification,” criminal prosecution for the word “war”
Griffin	Palingenetic ultranationalism	✓ Fully	”Rising from the knees,” myth of rebirth through war
Paxton	5 stages (reached stage 5)	✓ Fully	Full-scale invasion, mobilization, total repression
Snyder	Politics of eternity	✓ Fully	Cycle of eternal threats, absence of any promise of progress
Snyder	Schizofascism	✓ Fully	”Denazification” as justification for fascist practices

14 out of 14 of Eco’s features (12 fully, 2 in modified form), all three of Griffin’s elements, Paxton’s fifth stage, both of Snyder’s concepts. Not a single academic criterion of fascism proved inapplicable to modern Russia, though two of them are realized in a form that differs from the classical models.

Alternative Classifications: Why “Fascism” After All?

The thesis of fascism as applied to Russia is not shared by all researchers. The most thorough critique was offered by Marlene Laruelle, a professor at George Washington University and one of the leading Western specialists on Russian nationalism. In her book Is Russia Fascist? (2021), she argues that the term “fascism” is analytically imprecise and functions more as a geopolitical label than as a rigorous category. In Laruelle’s view, Russia is closer to conservative authoritarianism or personalist autocracy, and the key distinction from classical fascism is the absence of mass mobilization and revolutionary ideology.

Other researchers propose alternative terms: “kleptocratic authoritarianism” (emphasizing the systematic plundering of resources by the elite), “mafia state” (Luke Harding, Karen Dawisha), “sultanism” (following Juan Linz’s typology — a personalist dictatorship without a stable ideology).

These positions deserve serious consideration. However, we believe that by 2026 the balance of arguments has shifted:

Laruelle’s argument about the absence of mass mobilization was well-founded in 2021, before the full-scale invasion. After February 2022, Russia conducted military mobilization, criminalized anti-war sentiment, liquidated the remnants of independent media, and introduced mandatory patriotic education in schools. The scale of the transformation has exceeded the boundaries of “conservative authoritarianism.”
“Kleptocracy” and “mafia state” describe the economic dimension of the regime but do not explain the ideological one: the cult of tradition, genocidal rhetoric, the denial of subjecthood to neighboring nations, the construction of a myth of national rebirth. A regime that merely steals does not need the “denazification” of Ukraine.
“Sultanism” presupposes the absence of a stable ideology, but Russia by 2026 possesses a developed ideological infrastructure: mandatory courses on “Foundations of Russian Statehood” in universities, rewritten history textbooks, legislatively enshrined “traditional values,” a state church as an ideological partner.
14 out of 14 of Eco’s features, all of Griffin’s elements, Paxton’s fifth stage, both of Snyder’s concepts — no alternative classification explains this volume of correspondence with fascist models. This does not mean that Russia is identical to Nazi Germany. It means that among the available analytical categories, “fascism” accounts for the largest volume of observable phenomena.

We acknowledge that the Russian regime is a specific, modified form of fascism, distinct from the classical models (see Section 5). But deviation from the prototype does not negate membership in the category — just as modern populism differs from 19th-century populism while remaining populism.

Conclusion

Modern Russia under Putin’s leadership demonstrates not isolated traits but a full or near-full set of characteristics of a fascist state across all major academic classifications. This is not a metaphor and not an insult — it is the result of systematic analysis. Alternative classifications (conservative authoritarianism, kleptocracy, sultanism) describe individual aspects of the regime but do not explain the totality of its ideological, institutional, and behavioral characteristics.

The comparison with democratic countries that Russian propaganda insists upon is a false equivalence: it ignores the absence in Russia of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, free elections, and personal inviolability.

The word “fascism” in this context is not a label but an analytical category. Refusing to call things by their names does not make them less dangerous.

Sources

Theoretical Works

Umberto Eco, “Ur-Fascism”, The New York Review of Books, 1995.
Robert O. Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism”, The Journal of Modern History, 1998.
Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, Knopf, 2004.
Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, Routledge, 1991.
Roger Griffin, “The Palingenetic Core of Fascist Ideology”, Library of Social Science.
Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century, Tim Duggan Books, 2017.
Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, Tim Duggan Books, 2018.
Timothy Snyder, “Vladimir Putin’s politics of eternity”, The Guardian, 2018.

Human Rights Reports

Freedom House, “Russia: Freedom in the World 2025”.
Freedom House, “Russia: Freedom on the Net 2025”.
Human Rights Watch, “Russia: New Restrictions for ‘Foreign Agents’”, 2022.
Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Supreme Court Bans ‘LGBTQ+ Movement’”, 2023.
Human Rights Watch, “Russia Designates Another Rights Organization ‘Undesirable’”, 2023.
Amnesty International, “Russia/Ukraine: A Decade of Suppressing Non-Russian Identities in Occupied Crimea”, 2024.
OVD-Info, “Repression in Russia in 2024: Overview”.
OVD-Info, “Dataset: Politically Motivated Criminal Prosecutions”.

Journalistic Investigations and Media

Reuters, “Russia closes top rights group Memorial, capping year of crackdowns”, 2021.
Reuters, “European court rules Russia’s ‘foreign agent’ law violates rights”, 2022.
Reuters, “Putin says West is playing ‘dangerous, bloody and dirty’ game”, 2022.
Reuters, “Nobel-winning Russian journalist to challenge ‘foreign agent’ designation”, 2023.
Reuters, “Jailed Russian opposition leader Navalny dead”, 2024.
Reuters, “Evan Gershkovich: the Russia reporter who became the story”, 2024.
Reuters, “Russia’s record military spending crowding out schools, hospitals”, 2024.
AP News, “Putin vows to protect Russian security against Western attempts to ‘dismember’ the country”, 2023.
BBC, “Russia puts rights group Memorial on ‘foreign agents’ list”, 2015.
BBC, “Alexei Navalny: A timeline of the Russian opposition leader’s poisoning”, 2024.
The Moscow Times, “A Priest, a Pianist and a Spy: Russia’s Latest ‘Foreign Agent’ Designations”, 2024.
The Moscow Times, “Russia Doubles Budget for State-Sponsored ‘Youth Army’”, 2025.
The Guardian, “Court bans ‘extremist’ Crimean Tatar governing body Mejlis”, 2016.
RFE/RL, “Russia’s foreign agents registry”, 2024.
RFE/RL, “Russia native-languages bill passes legislative hurdle”, 2018.
Foreign Policy, “Russia’s War on Its Own Minorities”, 2025.
The Conversation, “Russia is cracking down on minority languages — but a resistance movement is growing”.
Nieman Reports, “Russia’s independent media landscape has shuttered”, 2022.
Jamestown Foundation, “Russia’s ‘Youth Army’: Sovietization, Militarization or Radicalization?”.
TAdviser, “Courts in Russia — acquittal rate statistics”.
Re:Russia, “Russian repression dynamics”.
Reuters, “Wagner boss Prigozhin listed in Russian plane crash with no survivors”, 2023.
Reuters, “Russia nationalises high-profile assets as some foreign firms quit”, 2023.
United States Institute of Peace, “How Russia’s Military Bloggers Shape the Course of Putin’s War”, 2023.
Detector Media, “How the Kremlin Uses and Tames the ‘Z-Telegram’”.
DFRLab (Atlantic Council), “Another Battlefield: Telegram as a Digital Front in Russia’s War Against Ukraine”, 2024.
Survival (IISS), “Telegram, ‘Milbloggers’ and the Russian State”, 2023.

Theoretical Works (Supplementary)

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951.
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion — Our Social Skin, University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Carnegie Endowment, “Blood and Iron: How Nationalist Imperialism Became Russia’s State Ideology”, 2023.
Marlene Laruelle, Is Russia Fascist? Unraveling Propaganda East and West, Cornell University Press, 2021.

Official Documents and Transcripts

Kremlin.ru, Address of the President to the Federal Assembly, 2023.
NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, 1997.
NATO, Enhanced Forward Presence factsheet, 2022.
NATO Review, “Zapad 2017 and Euro-Atlantic Security”, 2017.
BBC, “Russia’s Levada Centre polling group named foreign agent”, 2016.
International Court of Justice, Ukraine v. Russian Federation — Order on Provisional Measures, 2017.